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This article shows that firms “voluntarily” increase their disclosures in response to the threat
of more stringent disclosure regulations. These disclosures are mostly just sufficient to deter
regulation. However, when investment risk is low, both managers and investors might strictly
prefer the regulation deterring equilibrium.We further find that in many cases, regulation can only
be deterred by asymmetric disclosure behavior of the firms. This suggests that coordination issues
and free-riding may be important reasons why self-regulation may fail. The results also indicate
the importance of considering political pressure and regulatory threats to explain observed
symmetric and asymmetric voluntary disclosure behavior.
1. Introduction
 In resolving inefficiencies in the market, regulation by government or any other authority is
a costly solution which consumes much time and resources. Alternatively, threatening to regulate
may be sufficient to induce the desired behavior by market participants. In this article, we develop
a model to study the disclosure behavior of firms when they face the threat of more stringent
regulation. Such threat may induce market participants to self-regulate their industry. Firms can
try to avert regulation by “voluntarily” moving toward the desired behavior.
These tensions between desired and current behavior are abundantly present in corporate
disclosure, where managers’ potential benefits of information asymmetry and investors’ infor-
mation needs conflict. Consider, for example, the discussions on insufficient transparency of the
hedge fund industry. In 2007, former Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) head Harvey
Pitt stated in a conference of Certified Public Accountants (CPAs) that “Regulation of hedge funds
is on the horizon. The only question is whether that regulation will come from the government or
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from hedge funds themselves.”1 Although a so-called self-regulatory organization (SRO) under
government oversight is an option to make regulation more efficient (GAO, 2011), hedge funds
failed to avert regulation by increasing their transparency and disclosure (e.g., Dodd-Frank Act in
the United States and the Alternative Investment Fund Managers Directive [AIFMD] in Europe).
Executive compensation presents another example. Investors have long since asked for more
information on executive compensation packages, but firms have failed to provide this information
in a sufficient manner. In the United States, this has led to ever-increasing disclosure regulation
by the SEC. Starting in 1992 with a mandatory report justifying the firm’s compensation policies,
several amendments prescribing additional mandatory disclosures have followed over time, with
the most recent one being the SEC’s proposal on pay-for-performance disclosures.
Regulatory threat has proven partly effective in other settings, though. In the early 1990s,
environmental liability disclosures did improve under regulatory threat by the SEC. However,
the disclosures remained insufficient and additional regulation was introduced in 1996 (for more
details, see, e.g., Barth, McNichols, and Wilson, 1997; Alciatore, Callaway Dee, and Easton,
2004). Other examples include corporate governance codes and corporate social responsibility
disclosures. Corporate governance codes have been a product of self-regulation inmany countries.
Also, until now, most corporate social responsibility disclosures are voluntary and initiatives with
respect to integrated reporting are self-regulated. The industry has kept off regulation so far.
This article analyzes whether firms, when facing a threat of disclosure regulation, can fore-
stall government regulation by voluntarily increasing disclosure and thereby increasing investor
welfare. Contrary to several related articles (e.g., Leland, 1979; Gehrig and Jost, 1995; DeMarzo,
Fishman, and Hagerty, 2005), we do not consider an SRO but focus on sustainable equilibrium
strategies without active enforcement by the industry itself.
This article considers a setting in which firms may have an incentive not to disclose informa-
tion, whereas potential investors benefit frommore disclosure. Firms have many reasons for not or
only partly disclosing relevant information (see, e.g., Verrecchia, 1983; Dye, 1985; Penno, 1997;
Pae, 2005). The reason for nondisclosure or partial disclosure in this article is investor response
uncertainty as, for example, in Dye (1998), Dutta and Trueman (2002), and Suijs (2007).2 The
setting that we employ to achieve nondisclosure or partial disclosure in an unregulated setting is
comparable to Suijs (2007). The misalignment of interests between firms and investors creates a
demand for disclosure regulation.3
We model a financial market with two investment opportunities, for example, mutual funds
or firms, who compete for the investors’ capital. The investors can choose between investing
in the firms or in some outside investment opportunity (e.g., risk-free asset). To attract capital,
firms may voluntarily disclose (noisy) information about their future return. Each investment
opportunity can be either a success or a failure. In the unregulated setting, equilibrium strategies
exist in which no or little information is disclosed in equilibrium, but disclosure regulation, which
we assume to be costly, can increase investor welfare. We show that in such circumstances, a
threat of regulation may induce firms to disclose more information. For high-risk investments,
that is, investments with a relatively low probability of success, we find that firms’ disclosure
policies are just informative enough to avert disclosure regulation, that is, the additional increase
in investors’ welfare of disclosure regulation cancels out against the cost of disclosure regulation.
In the aforementioned conference of CPAs, Harvey Pitt said: “If the hedge fund industry is able to
realize that the benefits of self-regulation outweigh their costs, for a few dollars more the industry
can protect itself from unwelcome government intervention. Absent any concrete suggestions
from hedge funds . . . legislators and regulators will be happy to propose their own solutions, no
1 www.reuters.com/article/idUSN1626114020070517 : “Former SEC head urges hedge funds to self-regulate,”
May 17, 2007.
2 See Beyer, Cohen, Lys, and Walther (2010) for more details on this reason for the unraveling argument not to
hold.
3 For studies that focus on the demand for disclosure regulation, see, for example, Dye (1990), Suijs andWielhouwer
(2014), or Vives (1984).
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matter how impractical.”4 In these cases, the lower the cost of regulation per unit invested, the
more informative the disclosures must be to deter regulation.
We find that two types of regulation deterring disclosure equilibria may arise: a symmetric
disclosure equilibrium, where both firms’ disclosures are equally informative, and an asymmetric
disclosure equilibrium, where one firm makes a more informative disclosure than the other.
The symmetric equilibria are generally possible when the cost of regulation is high. For lower
cost levels, regulation can only be deterred by asymmetric disclosure, which may give rise to a
coordination problem. When firm managers are less averse to volatility in investment flows, the
range of asymmetric equilibria increases at the expense of symmetric equilibria. Furthermore, for
medium-to low-risk investments, that is, investments with an intermediate probability of success,
the asymmetric regulation deterring equilibria may feature full disclosure. Such full disclosure is
more than strictly necessary to deter regulation so that the net welfare benefits are strictly higher
under regulatory threat than under regulation. The explanation is that full disclosure maximizes
the likelihood of generating the good report, whereas the other firm is better off making limited
disclosures so as to prevent the investor from investing in the alternative investment opportunity.
Our findings provide some useful insights into self-regulatory processes. First, the outcome
of self-regulation remains socially inefficient. Full disclosure, which maximizes investor welfare,
will not be achieved without costs of regulation. However, whereas DeMarzo, Fishman, and
Hagerty (2005) find that the benefits of government intervention always cancel out against the
cost of it, we find that the threat of regulation can make investors strictly better off than regulation
itself.5 Second, authorities facilitating the process of self-regulation need not always focus on
getting the complete industry involved. In case of an asymmetric regulation deterring disclosure
equilibrium, it suffices when only several firms, preferably the market leaders, sign up to the self-
regulation. Third, self-regulation could fail because of a coordination problem, as nondisclosing
firms may free-ride: in an asymmetric regulation deterring equilibrium, one firm is better off than
the other. Finally, the results provide insight in when self-regulation is likely to succeed and thus
whether threatening with regulation is effective.
Our findings also provide a possible alternative explanation for observed voluntary disclo-
sures. Some voluntary disclosures may not be truly voluntary but instead be driven by a threat of
disclosure regulation. Consider, for example, the voluntary disclosures prior to the introduction of
the Securities Exchange Act in 1934. One could interpret these voluntary disclosures as evidence
of properly working market forces and therefore as a reason not to impose regulation (see, e.g.,
Benston, 1969, 1973). An alternative interpretation is that firms made voluntary disclosures to
avert more stringent regulation (see, e.g., Merino and Neimark, 1982).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses related research and
Section 3 presents the theoretical model. Section 4 analyzes the setting without any disclosure
regulations whereas Section 5 analyzes the setting with regulatory threat. Section 6 discusses the
results and Section 7 concludes.
2. Related research
 The article relates to several streams of research.We studywhether regulation can be averted
by noncooperative voluntary disclosures, which can be seen as a kind of self-regulation that is
not enforced. This is an important difference with early related research on, for example, whether
a government should grant power to the industry to set minimum quality levels, which are then
enforced by an SRO (e.g., Leland, 1979; Gehrig and Jost, 1995). The absence of an SRO is also
4 E. Chasan on www.reuters.com/article/idUSN1626114020070517 : “Former SEC head urges hedge funds to
self-regulate,” May 17, 2007.
5 Maxwell, Lyon, and Hackett (2000) too find that self-regulation driven by the threat of political intervention can
be socially preferable, but this is due to the fact that the costs of influencing policy are not incurred, whereas we do not
incorporate such costs.
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an important difference with DeMarzo, Fishman, and Hagerty (2005) who study the enforcement
strategy of an SRO that faces the risk of government intervention.
In the absence of an SRO, Glazer and McMillan (1992) show theoretically that a monop-
olistic firm that faces the threat of regulation lowers its prices to avert regulation. Following
this theoretical prediction, Ellison and Wolfram (2006) provide empirical evidence of actions in
the pharmaceutical industry to avert possible price regulation. Erfle and McMillan (1990) and
Stango (2003) study pricing decisions of large firms, following the threat of legislation in the oil
and credit card industries, respectively. An important difference between our study and that of
Glazer and McMillan (1992) is that we consider two firms, which allows to focus on coordina-
tion issues and free-riding problems when trying to avert regulation. This gives rise to possible
asymmetric equilibria for symmetric firms. This difference also applies to Maxwell, Lyon, and
Hackett (2000) who study whether firms can avert environmental regulation by jointly controlling
pollution. Although they consider multiple firms, only symmetric actions are considered.
Related studies on standard setting in financial reporting usually take on a regulator’s per-
spective and primarily focus on the desirability of specific types of accounting standards like
conservatism (e.g., Gigler, Kanodia, Sapra, and Venugopalan, 2009; Go¨x and Wagenhofer, 2009;
Caskey and Hughes, 2012; Li, 2013). Bertomeu and Cheynel (2013) and Bertomeu and Magee
(2015) analyze the political process of accounting standard setting, whereas Bebchuk andNeeman
(2009) and Friedman and Heinle (2013) study the politics and lobbying in the regulatory process
related to investor protection. Our study differs from these studies in that we analyze whether the
threat of implementing the disclosure rule that investors prefer affects firms’ voluntary disclosure
policy choices.
In our study, voluntary disclosure is affected by the threat of regulation. Several other recent
studies focused on the effects of other types of interactions on voluntary disclosure. Langberg and
Sivaramakrishnan (2008) and Langberg and Sivaramakrishnan (2010) analyze how subsequent
analysis of information with possibly relevant feedback affect the voluntary disclosures of firms,
and Corona and Randhawa (2018) show that an external evaluator that tries to detect mistakes
may lead to voluntary confessions of mistakes to build a better long-term reputation.
Finally, wemention that the disclosure setting that we consider can also be seen as a Bayesian
persuasion game. These games consider settings in which a sender commits to an information
structure before the realization of the information is known in order to increase the probability
that the receiver of the information takes a favorable action (e.g., Kamenica and Gentzkow,
2011). We also apply a model in which managers have to commit to a disclosure precision
prior to receiving the information, as is quite common in disclosure research in duopolies (e.g.,
Gal-Or, 1985; Vives, 1984; Raith, 1996; Hughes and Williams, 2008; Bagnoli and Watts, 2015).
As shown by Gentzkow and Kamenica (2016), competition may have ambiguous effects on
information revelation in persuasion, highlighting the importance of studying the effects of
strategic interaction between firms on their disclosure decisions.
3. Model description
 Consider a capital market with two risky investment opportunities (e.g., firms) and a capital-
constrained investor. The representative investor has a limited amount of capital c available for
investments. The investor can invest this capital in either (or both) of the two firms or in an
alternative investment opportunity (e.g., risk-free asset). The return of the alternative investment
opportunity is denoted by r0 > 0. The return of firm i = 1, 2 is denoted by r˜i , and the returns r˜1
and r˜2 are identically and independently distributed. The prior beliefs of the investor concerning
the return r˜i are that r˜i = rH with probability p and r˜i = rL with probability 1 − p. We assume
that rL < r0 < rH , and without loss of generality, we assume rL = 0. The investment decision
is denoted by x = (x0, x1, x2), where x0, x1, and x2 denote the respective investments in the
alternative investment opportunity, firm 1, and firm 2. An investment decision x is feasible
when xi ≥ 0 and x0 + x1 + x2 = c. The constraint xi ≥ 0 prohibits short selling, in line with our
C© The RAND Corporation 2019.
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assumption of constrained capital. The investor is assumed to be risk neutral and maximizes his
expected return.
Firmmanagers simultaneously choose (and announce) a disclosure policy σi , with σi ∈ [ 12 , 1]
representing the informativeness of the disclosure that firm i will make. A disclosure policy σi
generates a (possibly) noisy report ρi ∈ {rL, rH } on the return of firm i satisfying
Pr (ρ˜i = rH |r˜i = rH ) = Pr (ρ˜i = rL |r˜i = rL) = σi . (1)
The parameter σi determines the probability that the report ρi is correct. When σi = 12 , the
report is uninformative and when σi = 1, the report is fully revealing. We interpret σ as a
measure of informativeness, as it indicates to what extent the report informs investors on the
actual return of the firm (cf. Fishman and Hagerty, 1990; Gigler and Hemmer, 2001; Dutta and
Gigler, 2002). Observe that a firm has no direct control over which report is disclosed; a firm’s
disclosure policy choice only controls the accuracy of the report. The actual report that has to
be disclosed is generated by nature. The assumption that a firm decides on the disclosure policy
before learning the firm’s actual return is consistent with self-regulated disclosure. Because self-
regulated disclosure standards not only apply to the current period but also to future periods,
firm i needs to consider the consequences of a particular disclosure policy σi for all possible
realizations of the return r˜i , rather than just the current realization.6
The manager of firm i chooses disclosure policy σi so as to maximize expected utility from
investment received, that is, E(U (x˜i (σi , σ j ))). The utility functionU (x) is increasing and concave
in the amount invested x , allowing the manager to be risk averse. This utility function captures
empire building behavior by the manager (e.g., Baldenius, 2003; Hermalin and Weisbach, 2012).
We note that this objective may conflict with the firm’s best interest. Without loss of generality, we
may assume thatU (0) = 0. Notice that x˜i (σi , σ j ) is random, as it depends on the future disclosures
ρ˜i and ρ˜ j , which in turn depend on the disclosure policiesσi andσ j . This uncertaintywith respect to
investor response to disclosure allows for nondisclosure to be a sustainable equilibrium strategy.7
For ease of exposition, we assume that disclosure policy choice is costless. Section 6 discusses
how our results change when more precise disclosure policies are more costly. We assume that
disclosure policy choices are observable, as this may be most in line with a regulator threatening
to impose regulation to increase transparency.
We exclude the option for the investor to contract with the firms’ managers on disclosure
policy choice. A contracting solution requires a contract between the manager and the potential
investors, investors who may at that time have no investments in the firms and may decide not
to invest at all. Contracting only seems to work when the investor can offer a contract to the
firm and the investor can credibly commit not to invest in a firm that rejects the contract. The
latter condition is necessary because – as we will show later – the investor finds it optimal to
invest in the firms, even when these firms do not make any informative disclosures. The former
condition may be problematic for the more realistic setting with many investors rather than a
single investor. In that case, a representative of the investor population should contract with the
firms. One form of contracting between a firm and her potential investors that one can observe in
practice applies to public equity markets, with eachmarket formulating her own stock listing rules
prescribing, among other things, a minimum level of financial disclosures. This, however, can
also be interpreted as some form of self-regulation, as a public equity market sets the disclosures
rules and the firms choose which public equity market to enter. Furthermore, this setting is more
representative of the symmetric regulation deterring equilibrium that we discuss in Section 5 than
a setting where potential investors contract with firms.
6 Unconditional disclosure policy choices are quite common in disclosure research on duopoly settings. See, for
example, Gal-Or (1985, 1986), Vives (1984, 2002), Raith (1996), Hughes andWilliams (2008), Bagnoli andWatts (2010,
2015).
7 It is crucial to our analysis that nondisclosure arises in an unregulated setting and that disclosure regulation is
desirable. Uncertainty with respect to investor response achieves this (cf. Dye, 1998; Dutta and Trueman, 2002; Suijs,
2007).
C© The RAND Corporation 2019.
8 / THE RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
FIGURE 1
SEQUENCE OF EVENTS
The sequence of events is as follows (cf. Figure 1). Firms (i.e., their managers) first simulta-
neously choose their disclosure policy σi . Then, the regulator decides whether to set a minimum
disclosure standard and firms respond to that by subsequently adjusting their disclosure policies.
Note that we do not consider this decision of the regulator (and the adjustment in disclosure
policies) until Section 5, and first consider the benchmark case in which this decision is absent
in Section 4. Then, firms publicly disclose a (noisy) financial report ρi in line with the chosen
disclosure policy σi . The investor observes the financial reports ρi and their informativeness σi
and subsequently makes his investment decision. Finally, the payoffs realize.
In order to focus on settings where nondisclosure may be optimal, we assume that without
disclosure, the expected payoff of investing in firm i (i.e., of the risky investment) is higher than
the (certain) payoff of the outside option, implying that
prH > r0. (2)
4. Unregulated disclosures
 This section analyzes disclosure policy choices in the absence of disclosure regulation or any
threat thereof. We first derive the optimal investment decision x∗ = (x∗0 , x∗1 , x∗2 ), given all possible
disclosure policies after which the Nash equilibrium disclosure policies can be determined.
 Optimal investments and investor welfare. The investment decision xi of the investor
depends on the expected return, which is updated based on the disclosed reports ρ˜i and ρ˜ j and the
disclosure policies σi and σ j . What is particularly important for our setting is when the investor
prefers investing in the alternative investment opportunity over investing in firm i , that is, when
E(r˜i |ρi ) < r0. Because prior beliefs satisfy E(r˜i ) > r0 by assumption (2), the investor prefers
the alternative investment opportunity over firm i only when firm i has disclosed a bad report
and this bad report ρi = rL is sufficiently informative, so that E(r˜i |ρ˜i = rL) = p(1−σi )rHp(1−σi )+(1−p)σi < r0,
that is, the disclosure policy σi exceeds the threshold value σ ∗(p) = p(rH−r0)p(rH−r0)+(1−p)r0 . For ease
of exposition, we regularly write σ ∗ instead of σ ∗(p) when there is no confusion about the
argument p.
Table 1 summarizes the optimal investment decisions. Because of risk neutrality, the investor
will invest all his capital in the alternative with the highest expected return. This implies that if
only one firm has reported good news (rH ), the investor invests in that firm. If both firms have
reported good news, the investor invests in the firm with the most informative disclosure policy,
as this firm is more likely to yield the high return. When the reports are equally informative,
the capital is allocated equally among the two firms. If both firms have reported bad news, the
investor prefers the firm with the least informative disclosure policy over the firm with the more
informative disclosure policy, as the report of the former firm is more likely to be wrong. Whether
C© The RAND Corporation 2019.
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TABLE 1 Optimal Investment Decision (x∗i , x
∗
j ) as a Function of Observed Reports ρi and ρ j and Disclosure
Policies σi and σ j
Case: I II III IV
σi = σ j σi = σ j σi > σ j σi > σ j
(ρi , ρ j ) σi ≤ σ ∗ σi > σ ∗ σ j ≤ σ ∗ σ j > σ ∗
(rL , rL ) (
1
2
c, 1
2
c) (0, 0) (0, c) (0, 0)
(rL , rH ) (0, c) (0, c) (0, c) (0, c)
(rH , rL ) (c, 0) (c, 0) (c, 0) (c, 0)
(rH , rH ) (
1
2
c, 1
2
c) ( 1
2
c, 1
2
c) (c, 0) (c, 0)
the investor will invest in the firmwith the least informative disclosure policy depends on whether
the informativeness is sufficiently low, that is, less than σ ∗. If it is, the investor assigns little weight
to the financial report, so that he still invests all his capital in this particular firm. If it is not,
he prefers investing in the alternative investment opportunity. Therefore, when the bad financial
reports are equally informative and the informativeness is less than σ ∗, the capital is again equally
allocated to the two firms. If the informativeness exceeds σ ∗, everything will be invested in the
alternative investment opportunity.
Let ER(σi , σ j ) denote the expected return of the investor per unit of investment given the
disclosure policies σi and σ j . The total expected return then equals c · ER(σi , σ j ). Let π (σ ) =
pσ + (1 − p)(1 − σ ) denote the probability that disclosure policy σ generates the good report.
It holds that8:
ER(σi , σ j ) = prH (p + 2σi (1 − p)) (3)
if σi ≥ σ j and σ j ≤ σ ∗; and
ER(σi , σ j ) = prH
(
σi + (1 − π (σi ))σ j
)+ (1 − π (σi ))(1 − π (σ j ))r0 (4)
if σi ≥ σ j > σ ∗.
The investor’s expected return is increasing in the disclosure policies because more precise
information enables the investor to better identify the investment opportunity with the highest
return. Observe, though, that for σ j ≤ σ ∗, the investor’s expected return depends only on the most
informative disclosure policy σi . The explanation for this is as follows. When σi > σ j (i.e., case
III in Table 1), the investor’s decision depends only on the most informative report ρ˜i : he invests
in firm i when firm i’s report is good, and he invests in firm j when firm i’s report is bad. The least
informative report σ j is irrelevant, because σ j ≤ σ ∗: the investor’s posterior beliefs regarding
the return of firm j satisfy E(r˜ j |ρ j ) ≥ r0, irrespective of what report firm j discloses. Hence,
investing in firm j is always preferred over investing in the alternative investment opportunity.
When σi = σ j (i.e., case I in Table 1), the investor’s decision does depend on both reports, but
because they have equal precision, expected return depends only on σi (= σ j ).
We emphasize that the investor’s expected return is increasing in the disclosure precision
of either the most informative report or both reports. Investor welfare is thus increasing with
disclosure even when the investor never invests in the outside option. Observe that because the
fully informative equilibrium maximizes the investor’s expected return, a demand for disclosure
regulation may arise whenever a nondisclosure or partially informative disclosure equilibrium
arises.
8 The following equations follow from straightforward calculations. Consider, for example, cases I and IV. In case
I, σi = σ j = σ ≤ σ ∗. It then follows that ER(σi , σ j ) = π (σ )2[0.5E(r˜i |rH ) + 0.5E(r˜ j |rH )] + π (σ )[1 − π (σ )]E(r˜i |rH ) +
π (σ )[1 − π (σ )]E(r˜ j |rH ) + [1 − π (σ )]2[0.5E(r˜i |rL ) + 0.5E(r˜ j |rL )]. For case IV, σi > σ j > σ ∗. Given the optimal in-
vestment decisions, the expected return then equals ER(σi , σ j ) = π (σi )E(r˜i |rH ) + [1 − π (σi )]π (σ j )E(r˜ j |rH ) + [1 −
π (σi )][1 − π (σ j )]r0.
C© The RAND Corporation 2019.
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TABLE 2 Expected Utility for the Manager of firm i when Disclosure Policies are σi and σ j . Cases I–IV
Correspond to the Cases I–IV Defined in Table 1
Case: disclosure 1
U (c)
· E(U (xi )) 1U (c) · E(U (x j ))
I σi = σ j , σi ≤ σ ∗ (1 − π (σi ) + π (σi )2) (1 − π (σi ) + π (σi )2)
−u(1 − 2π (σi ) + 2π (σi )2) −u(1 − 2π (σi ) + 2π (σi )2)
II σi = σ j , σi > σ ∗ π (σi )(1 − π (σi )u) π (σi )(1 − π (σi )u)
III σi > σ j , σ j ≤ σ ∗ π (σi ) (1 − π (σi ))
IV σi > σ j , σ j > σ ∗ π (σi ) π (σ j )(1 − π (σi ))
 Optimal disclosure policies. Given the optimal investment decision, we can derive the
expected utility for manager i , given disclosure policies σi and σ j . The expected utility depends
on the relative values of σi and σ j and is presented in Table 2 for each of the four possible
disclosure policy combinations from Table 1. The parameter u is defined as u = U (c)−U (
1
2
c)
U (c)
and
measures the degree of risk aversion of the manager. It holds that u ∈ (0, 1
2
] and higher values of
u imply a lower degree of risk aversion. In particular, u = 1
2
corresponds to risk neutrality.
Disclosure policies σˆi and σˆ j constitute a Nash equilibrium when for each manager i ,
disclosure policy σˆi maximizes expected utility given the disclosure policy σˆ j of manager j , that
is, E(U (x˜i (σˆi , σˆ j )) = maxσi E(U (x˜i (σi , σˆ j )).
The following proposition presents the equilibrium disclosure strategies in the absence of
regulation or any threat of regulation. For this, define for p < 1
2
σH (p) = 1−p1−2p − 1(1−2u)(1−2p)
(√
u(1 − u) − u
)
, (5)
and for p ≥ 1
2
, the continuous function
σL(p) =
{
1
2
for p < 3
4
− 1
2
u,
1
2
+ 1
2(2p−1)
√
2(2p−1)
1−2u − 1 for p ≥ 34 − 12u.
(6)
Further, define
pH (σ ) = − 1−σ2σ−1 + 1(1−2u)(2σ−1)
(√
u(1 − u) − u
)
(7)
pL(σ ) = 12 + 12(1−2u)(2σ−1)2
(
1 −√1 − (1 − 2u)2(2σ − 1)2) (8)
pFD = 1u
(
1 − √1 − u) . (9)
Observe that σH (p) ≥ 12 , σL(p) ≥ 12 and that both σH (p) and σL(p) are increasing in p. Further,
observe that pH (σ ) and pL(σ ) are the inverse functions of σH (p) and σL(p), respectively. It holds
that pH (σ ) <
1
2
< pL(σ ). Finally, define p ∈ [ 12 , 1] as the unique solution of p = pL(σ ∗(p)).
Proposition 1. In an unregulated setting, the following Nash equilibria exist:
A (σˆ1, σˆ2) = (σ, σ ) with 12 ≤ σ ≤ min(σ ∗(p), σH (p)) if and only if r0/rH ≤ p < 12 ;
B (σˆ1, σˆ2) = (σ, σ ) with σL(p) ≤ σ ≤ σ ∗(p) if and only if 12 ≤ p ≤ p;
C (σˆ1, σˆ2) = (1, 1) if and only if p ≥ pFD.
D Amixed strategywhere firm i = 1, 2mixes between disclosure policies σi = σ ∗(p) and σi = 1
if and only if p ≤ p ≤ pFD.
All proofs are in Appendix A. Proposition 1 states that only symmetric equilibria exist,
that is, both firms choose the same disclosure policy. An equilibrium can be uninformative (i.e.,
C© The RAND Corporation 2019.
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σˆi = σˆ j = 12 ), partially informative (i.e., σˆi = σˆ j = σ > 12 ), or fully revealing (i.e., σˆi = σˆ j = 1).
Existence of a particular disclosure equilibrium depends on the ex ante success probability p.
The intuition for the equilibrium strategies is as follows. In a symmetric equilibrium, the
capital that firm i acquires equals either c, 1
2
c, or zero. In contrast, when firm i deviates to a
nonequilibrium disclosure policy, the capital that firm i acquires equals either c or zero. Roughly
speaking, the potential benefit of the nonequilibrium disclosure policy is that the likelihood of
acquiring all of the investor’s capital c may be higher; the cost is the increased volatility in the
acquired amount of capital. A risk-averse manager values the equal sharing of the investor’s
capital.
Let us start by providing the intuition behind the upper bound σ ∗ for not fully revealing
pure-strategy equilibria. An equilibrium with σi = σ j > σ ∗ and σi = σ j < 1 is never sustainable.
In such case, firm i acquires capital from the investor only when firm i generates the good report;
firm i does not acquire any capital when she generates the bad report. Therefore, firm i benefits
from deviating to a marginally more informative disclosure policy. Such a deviation does not
materially affect the likelihood of generating the good report, but firm i no longer has to share
the capital with firm j when both firms generate the good report.
Other lower and upper bounds on σ may be relevant, too. Let us start with part A, where
p < 1
2
. For these values of p, lowering the disclosure precision of the report increases the
probability of the good report. Therefore, only deviations to a lower disclosure precision are
possibly valuable. Deviating to a lower disclosure precision is only beneficial for firm i when
firm j discloses the bad report, as in that case, all of the investor’s capital is acquired. Because
this benefit is higher when firm j is more likely to disclose the bad report, the likelihood of
firm j disclosing the bad report cannot be too high. This likelihood of disclosing a bad report is
increasing in the disclosure precision for p < 1
2
. This explains the upper bound σH (p): for more
informative disclosure policies, it would be optimal to deviate to nondisclosure.
Next, consider part B where p ≥ 1
2
. Here, increasing the disclosure precision increases the
probability of the good report. Therefore, only deviations to a higher precision level are possibly
valuable. Deviating to a higher disclosure precision is only beneficial for firm i when Firm j
discloses the good report, as in that case, all of the investor’s capital is acquired. Because this
benefit is higher when firm j is less likely to disclose the good report, the likelihood of firm j
disclosing the good report cannot be too low. This explains the lower bound σL(p).
Concerning the full disclosure equilibrium in part C, observe that deviating to a less infor-
mative disclosure policy is beneficial to firm i when firm j generates the bad report and it is
costly when both firms generate the good report. Clearly, for sufficiently low values of p, the
likelihood of firm j generating the bad report is high enough to make such deviations attractive.
This explains the lower bound pFD.
Figure 2 illustrates the existence of the symmetric equilibria of Proposition 1. Panel A
illustrates the case where p < pFD , and Panel B illustrates the case where p > pFD . Figure 2
shows that, for a given value of p, usually multiple equilibria exist; for example, the range
[max{0.5; σL(p)}, σ ∗(p)] in regionB, given a value of p, indicates all possible disclosure strategies
σ that constitute a symmetric equilibrium strategy. For p < pFD, the equilibrium solutions in A–D
are mutually exclusive. When p ≥ pFD , the mixed-strategy equilibrium D does not exist. In that
case, equilibria B and C exist simultaneously for pFD ≤ p ≤ p.
The multiplicity of equilibria is driven by managerial risk aversion. In the extreme case of
risk-neutral managers, that is, u = 1
2
, many equilibria cease to exist. For p < 1
2
, the no disclosure
equilibrium (σˆ1, σˆ2) = ( 12 , 12 ) is the only equilibrium. The reason for this is that risk-neutral
managers do not assign any value to sharing the investor’s capital c. Consequently, a manager
is better off deviating to a less informative disclosure policy, as this increases the likelihood of
generating the good report, which yields all of the investor’s capital. Second, for 1
2
≤ p ≤ pFD =
2 − √2, the mixed-strategy equilibrium exists, whereas for p ≥ pFD = 2 −
√
2, full disclosure
is the unique equilibrium. For p ≥ 1
2
, the symmetric equilibria (σi , σ j ) = (σ, σ ) with σ ≤ σ ∗
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FIGURE 2
EXISTENCE OF SYMMETRIC DISCLOSURE EQUILIBRIA (σˆ1, σˆ2) = (σ, σ) AS A FUNCTION OF THE
SUCCESS PROBABILITY p. THE LABELS OF THE DIFFERENT AREAS IN THE GRAPH REFER TO
PROPOSITION 1 A–D. THE GRAPH ILLUSTRATES ALL POSSIBLE EQUILIBRIUM VALUES OF σ FOR
EACH VALUE OF PARAMETER p
no longer exist: because risk-neutral managers do not assign any value to sharing the investor’s
capital c, a manager is better off deviating to a marginally more informative disclosure policy, as
this increases the likelihood of disclosing the good report.
Finally, observe that when assumption (2) does not apply, that is prH ≤ r0, the full disclosure
equilibrium arises. Because in this case firms attract no capital when they disclose a bad report,
each firm prefers to use a more informative disclosure policy than its competitor, which results
in a race to the top.
5. Threat of disclosure regulation
 We now introduce a regulator who acts in the interests of the investors. When investor
welfare is suboptimal, disclosure regulation may be a means to enhance investor welfare. We
model disclosure regulation by means of a minimum precision level σR that firms need to
comply with. Such a minimum precision level increases the likelihood that the report is correct
and thus the informativeness of this report to investors, and thereby the investor’s expected
return. Regulation may only be welfare-enhancing when in the absence of regulation, partial or
nondisclosure results. Let σU denote the disclosure level that would arise in equilibrium in an
unregulated setting. We confine our attention to the pure-strategy equilibria (i.e., equilibria A
and B in Proposition 1).9 Proposition 1 implies that given an unregulated disclosure level σU ,
the following range of values for p are to be considered: max(p∗(σU ), pH (σU )) ≤ p ≤ pL(σU )
where p∗(σ ) = σr0
σr0+(1−σ )(rH−r0) is the inverse of σ
∗(p) (cf. Figure 2). For values of p greater than
pL(σU ) or less than max(p∗(σU ), pH (σU )), the disclosure policy σU could not have resulted as
the unregulated equilibrium. Note that because σU ≤ σ ∗, it holds that pL(σU ) ≤ p. In Figure 2,
the dependence of the range of relevant values for p on the given unregulated equilibrium σU is
indicated by the dotted line σ = σU .
For disclosure regulation to be effective, enforcement is required and such enforcement
is costly. Regulatory costs can be quite significant. The costs include the cost of introducing
new disclosure regulations but also the periodic costs of monitoring compliance with the new
regulations. This section analyzes whether threatening with disclosure rules may be an alternative
means to enhance investor welfare. The setting is consistent with a setting where a regulator offers
the firms the opportunity to self-regulate disclosure. When self-regulation does not succeed or
9 The deterring strategy for the mixed-strategy equilibrium D is presented in Appendix B and is similar in spirit to
one of the resulting asymmetric deterring equilibria.
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when the self-regulated disclosures do notmeet the regulator’s standards, the regulator will impose
and enforce the desired disclosure regulations.
The welfare function of the regulator equals c · [ER(σR, σR) − ER(σU , σU )] − k(σR), where
ER(σR, σR) is the expected return of the investor when minimum disclosure precision σR is
enforced and k(σR) is the cost of introducing and enforcing the new regulation. We assume that
the welfare function is increasing in σR so that σR = 1 is optimal, that is, the regulator will threaten
the firms with full disclosure. For ease of exposition, denote by k > 0 the cost of full disclosure
regulation.
 Credible threat of regulation. The first step in this analysis is the credibility of the threat
of regulation. Threatening with disclosure regulation is credible only if the benefit of imposing
regulation exceeds the cost k. Otherwise, the investorwould not benefit fromdisclosure regulation,
as we assume that they eventually pay the cost of regulation k.
Given σU , the disclosure level that arises in equilibrium in an unregulated setting, the
investor’s benefit of disclosure regulation amounts to the capital invested (c) times the increase in
expected return due to moving from the unregulated to the regulated setting, that is, c(ER(1, 1) −
ER(σU , σU )). Then, the threat of disclosure regulation is credible if and only if the cost of
regulation is less than the benefit of regulation, that is, k < cγ (p, σU ) where
γ (p, σU ) = ER(1, 1) − ER(σU , σU ). (10)
Focusing on regulation cost per unit of investment k/c, we obtain that the threat of regulation is
credible if and only if k/c < γ (p, σU ).
 Definition of a regulation deterring disclosure equilibrium. A regulation deterring dis-
closure equilibrium arises when the equilibrium disclosure policy choices of the firms are such
that the regulator does not impose full disclosure (i.e., σR = 1). One can interpret regulation
deterring equilibria as cases where self-regulation works and is forthcoming. In these cases, self-
regulation is a nonbinding agreement between the two firms on their disclosure policies. That the
agreement is nonbinding reflects the fact that in practice, self-regulated disclosures in the absence
of a self-regulatory organization are not actively enforced.
A regulation deterring disclosure equilibrium (σˆi , σˆ j ) arises if and only if for each firm i ,
the following conditions are satisfied:
(σˆi , σˆ j ) = (1, 1), (11)
k/c ≥ ER(1, 1) − ER(σˆi , σˆ j ), (12)
E(U (x∗i (σˆi , σˆ j ))) ≥ E(U (x∗i (σi , σˆ j )))
for all σi such that k/c ≥ ER(1, 1) − ER(σi , σˆ j ), and (13)
E(U (x∗i (σˆi , σˆ j ))) ≥ E(U (x∗i (1, 1)))
for all σi such that k/c < ER(1, 1) − ER(σi , σˆ j ). (14)
Condition (11) states that the firms’ disclosure policies reveal less information than the
regulated, full disclosure policy.10 Condition (12) states that regulation is deterred, that is, the
cost of regulation exceeds the increase in investor welfare of disclosure regulation. Condition
(13) states that firms will not deviate to other disclosure policies that still deter regulation,
whereas condition (14) states that firms will not deviate to other disclosure policies that do
trigger regulation. Note that when the disclosure policy σi triggers regulation, the regulator will
10 When full disclosure is required to deter regulation, firms are indifferent between deterring regulation and
regulation. In that case, we assume firms choose the unregulated equilibrium disclosure policy σU so that regulation is
implemented.
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impose disclosure regulation σR = 1 so that firm i’ s payoff equals E(U (x∗i (1, 1))) rather than
E(U (x∗i (σi , σˆ j ))).
In addition, we do not consider whether mixed-strategy deterring equilibrium strategies are
possible, as a regulator cannot verify the probability in a mixed strategy, but can only observe
the resulting disclosure precision. We thus confine our attention to pure strategies that satisfy
conditions (11)–(14).
 Regulation deterring disclosure equilibria. A regulation deterring disclosure equilibrium
is called symmetric when both firms choose the same disclosure policy, that is, σˆ1 = σˆ2; it is
called asymmetric when firms use different disclosure policies, that is, σˆ1 = σˆ2. Without loss
of generality, we denote by firm i the firm that chooses the more informative disclosure policy,
that is, σˆi > σˆ j . From the perspective of self-regulation, symmetric disclosure is most consistent
with the first attempts to organize self-regulated disclosures in practice. When firms try to self-
regulate disclosures, this usually implies that all firms would agree to disclose in line with the
same, mutually agreed standards.
Before we present the regulation deterring equilibria, we first introduce some additional
notation. Define for p < 1
2
γH (p, σU ) = γ (p, σU ) − 2p(1−p)rH(1−2p)
(
1
2
− 1
1−2u
(√
u(1 − u) − u
))
. (15)
Furthermore, define
γ ∗(p, σU ) = γ (p, σU ) − 2rH p(1 − p)(σ ∗ − σU ) (16)
γ (p) = (1 − p)2r0 (17)
σ (k/c) = σU + γ (σU )−k/c2p(1−p)rH . (18)
The symmetric disclosure equilibria that deter regulation are presented in the following
proposition.
Proposition 2. LetσU ≤ σ ∗ be the equilibriumdisclosure precision level in the unregulated setting.
Then, the following symmetric regulation deterring disclosure equilibria (σˆi , σˆ j ) = (σ, σ ) exist:
A for p < 1
2
: (σˆ1, σˆ2) = (σ, σ ) with σ (k/c) ≤ σ ≤ min(σ ∗(p), σH (p)) if and only if
max(γ ∗(p, σU ), γH (p, σU )) ≤ k/c < γ (p, σU ).
B for p ≥ 1
2
: (σˆ1, σˆ2) = (σ, σ ) with σ (k/c) ≤ σ ≤ σ ∗(p) if and only if
γ ∗(p, σU ) ≤ k/c < γ (p, σU ).
For a symmetric regulation deterring equilibrium (σ, σ ), two conditions have to be met.
First, the disclosure policies (σ, σ ) should be a Nash equilibrium in the benchmark case with
no (threat of) regulation. As in the case without regulation, disclosure policies (σ, σ ) with
σ > σ ∗ can never be an equilibrium, as firms have an incentive to deviate to a marginally more
informative equilibrium. Disclosure policies (σ, σ ) with σ ≤ σ ∗ should be an equilibrium in the
unregulated setting because firms can deviate to a less informative disclosure policy without
triggering regulation. This is because in this case, investor welfare is only determined by the most
informative disclosure policy. Therefore, the same upper bounds on σ apply, as in Proposition 1.
Second, the disclosure policies should be sufficiently informative to deter regulation. That is, the
increase in welfare from full disclosure should be less than or equal to the cost of regulation per
unit of investment, that is, ER(1, 1) − ER(σ, σ ) ≥ k/c. This explains that σ should be at least
σ (k/c).
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Whether the set of policies σ that deter regulation is not empty can be expressed in terms
of the cost of regulation. The least informative policy that still deters regulation (σ (k/c)) should
be an equilibrium in the unregulated setting and the threat of regulation given the unregulated
equilibrium should be credible. The latter yields the upper bound γ (p, σU ) on k/c (as discussed
in the subsection “Credible threat of regulation” ). The former implies that the cost of regulation
cannot be too low, as that would require the disclosure precision that is required to deter regulation
to exceed σ ∗(p), in which case a symmetric equilibrium is no longer sustainable. For part A,
the informativeness of the disclosure policy is bounded from above by min(σ ∗(p), σH (p)) (cf.
Proposition 1A). The corresponding lower bound on σ (k/c) is max(γ ∗(p, σU ), γH (p, σU )). For
part B, recall from Proposition 1B that the informativeness of the disclosure policy is bounded
from above by σ ∗(p), which explains the lower bound γ ∗(p, σU ) on the cost of regulation.
Regulation may also be deterred when firms apply different disclosure precisions. The
asymmetric regulation deterring disclosure equilibria are presented in Proposition 3.
Proposition 3. Let σU ≤ σ ∗ be the equilibrium disclosure precision level in the unregulated
setting. Then, the following asymmetric regulation deterring disclosure equilibria (σˆi , σˆ j ) exist:
A for p < 1
2
: σˆ j < σˆi = σ (k/c) if and only if
γ (p) ≤ k/c < max(γH (p, σU ), γ ∗(p, σU ));
B for p ≥ 1
2
: σˆ j ≤ σ ∗(p) < σˆi = 1 if and only if
γ (p) ≤ k/c < γ ∗(p, σU )
and p ≤ pFD(u).
It can be seen immediately from the conditions on k/c that the symmetric and asymmetric
regulation deterring equilibria are mutually exclusive. The asymmetric equilibria result for lower
values of k/c. Observe that in an asymmetric regulation deterring equilibrium, the payoffs and
expected utilities differ across the two firms. Firm i receives all of the investor’s capital when she
generates the good report and she receives no capital when she generates the bad report; in that
case, firm j receives all of the investor’s capital.11 Hence, the payoffs and expected utilities of
the two firms are determined by the likelihood that firm i generates the good report. Therefore,
the more informative disclosure policy yields higher expected utility than the less informative
disclosure policy if and only if p > 1
2
.12
When the symmetric pair of disclosure policies (σ (k/c), σ (k/c)) that would deter regulation
is not sustainable in equilibrium because firms benefit from deviating to a less informative
disclosure policy, an asymmetric regulation deterring equilibrium may exist. To deter regulation,
at least one firm (i.e., firm i) must disclose with precision level σ (k/c) or higher.
When p < 1
2
, firm i will choose precision level σ (k/c), as this maximizes the likelihood
of disclosing the good report conditional on deterring the regulation. Firm j discloses with low
precision, so as to acquire all of the investor’s capital when firm i discloses the bad report. Because
p < 1
2
implies that both firms are more likely to disclose a bad report than a good report, there is
no benefit for firm j to disclose more precisely than firm i , that is, a race to the top does not arise.
When 1
2
< p ≤ pFD(u), firm i will choose full disclosure, as this maximizes the likelihood
of disclosing the good report. Firm j still discloses with low precision, so as to acquire all capital
when firm i discloses the bad report. The reason that a race to the top does not arise is because
p ≤ pFD(u). The likelihood of disclosing the good report is not high enough so that the benefits
11 When firm j would choose precision σ j > σ ∗(p), it would not always receive the investor’s capital, but this never
occurs in equilibrium, as then firm j would be better off choosing a disclosure policy σ j ≤ σ ∗(p) or σ j ≥ σi .
12 Therefore, if one of the two firms is a first mover or has a credible threat to choose a disclosure strategy, this firm
would choose the low disclosure precision when p < 1
2
but the high disclosure precision when p > 1
2
(i.e., the disclosure
policy with the higher likelihood of generating the good report).
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FIGURE 3
EXISTENCE OF REGULATION DETERRING DISCLOSURE EQUILIBRIA AS A FUNCTION OF THE
SUCCESS PROBABILITY p AND PER UNIT REGULATORY COST k/c. THE LABELS OF THE DIFFERENT
AREAS IN THE GRAPH REFER TO THE PROPOSITIONS THAT DESCRIBE THE SYMMETRIC AND
ASYMMETRIC REGULATION DETERRING EQUILIBRIA
of full disclosure for firm j do not outweigh the costs: the likelihood that full disclosure by firm j
results in disclosing the bad report is still considerable, in which case, firm j would receive zero
investment.
To explain the boundaries on k/c in Proposition 3A, recall that a symmetric equilibrium
is not sustainable for p < 1
2
when σ (k/c) > σ ∗(p), or when σ (k/c) > σH (p) (Proposition 1A
and Figure 2). The lower bound σ (k/c) ≥ σH (p) induces the upper bound k/c ≤ γH (p, u) on
the cost of regulation, and k/c ≤ γ ∗(p, u) arises from σ (k/c) ≥ σ ∗(p). Observe that because
an asymmetric equilibrium requires σ (k/c) > σ ∗(p) or σ (k/c) > σH (p), it follows that k/c <
max(γH (p, σU ), γ ∗(p, σU )). Further, observe that this upper bound on the cost of regulation is
identical to the lower bound in Proposition 2A for a symmetric deterring equilibrium to exist.
For Proposition 3B, the bounds on the cost of regulation follow from σ ∗(p) < σ (k/c) ≤ 1.
Note that when p ≥ 1
2
and σ (k/c) < 1, the equilibrium disclosure level for the more infor-
mative firm i (cf. Proposition 3B) is higher than necessary to deter regulation. As a consequence,
investor welfare when deterring regulation is higher than investor welfare under regulation.
Indeed, for the equilibrium of Proposition 3B, it holds that ER(σˆi , σˆ j ) > ER(σ (k/c), σˆ j ) =
ER(1, 1) − k/c. Hence, when p ≥ 1
2
and σ (k/c) < 1, investors are better off by merely the threat
of regulation than by regulation itself.
Note that also the symmetric regulation deterring equilibria may consist of levels of dis-
closure that exceed the minimum level required to deter regulation. These equilibrium strategies
are, however, also equilibrium strategies in the unregulated setting. Dependent on the equilibrium
selection, it is therefore likely that either the more informative disclosure already resulted, making
deterring regulation by symmetric disclosures not feasible, or — in case no disclosure resulted in
the unregulated setting — that firms under regulatory threat will also choose the minimum level
of disclosure to deter regulation, in which case investors are indifferent between regulation and
regulatory threat. We elaborate on the equilibrium selection under payoff and risk dominance in
the next section.
6. Discussion
 Figure 3 shows the existence of regulation deterring disclosure equilibria as a function of
the success probability p and regulatory cost per unit investment k/c, given a level σU (which is
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indicated in Figure 2).13 The labels of the different areas in the graph refer to the propositions
that describe the symmetric and asymmetric regulation deterring disclosure equilibria. Recall that
Proposition 2 concerns the symmetric equilibria and that Proposition 3 concerns the asymmetric
equilibria. Panels A and B match the unregulated equilibria in Panels A and B of Figure 2. In
Panel A, pFD > pL(σU ), making the condition p ≤ pFD from Proposition 3B irrelevant, whereas
in Panel B, pFD < pL(σU ), which limits the values of p for which an asymmetric equilibrium
cf. Proposition 3B exists. Note that Figure 3 indicates the existence of equilibria as a function of
p and k/c so that, contrary to Figure 2, the possible equilibrium disclosure precision levels σ are
not indicated.
For a given value of p, Figure 3 shows that symmetric regulation deterring equilibria exist
for relatively high values of the cost of regulation per unit of investment k/c and asymmetric
regulation deterring equilibria exist for intermediate values of k/c. The explanation for this is that
the lower the cost of regulation, the more informative the disclosure policies should be in order
to deter regulation. For high values of k/c, disclosure precision can remain below the threshold
σ ∗(p) so that symmetric disclosure equilibria are feasible. For intermediate values of k/c, one
firm has to use a disclosure precision above the threshold σ ∗(p). Also, for even lower values of
k/c, both firms would have to use disclosure precision levels above the threshold σ ∗(p). This
would result in full disclosure by both firms as the only option which is not considered a regulation
deterring equilibrium.
Observe that the lower bound γ (p) is decreasing in the success probability p. This indicates
that implementation of regulation will be observed especially when the success probability is
low, that is, in high-risk markets or economic bad times. This is precisely when threatening
with regulation yields the same investor welfare as regulation itself. Recall that for p ≥ 1
2
, the
investor is (weakly) better off when the regulator threatens with regulation than when the regulator
imposes regulation. This implies that threatening with regulation is more efficient than regulation
in low-risk markets or economic good times.
Regarding the dependence on σU , note that for higher values of σU , that is, when firms
already disclose with higher precision, some of the symmetric deterring equilibria disappear, as
for these values, the threat of regulation is not credible anymore. Also, the region of values of p
for which deterrence of regulation may be relevant shifts to the right when σU increases.
 Equilibrium selection. Proposition 1 shows that in the unregulated setting multiple equi-
libria exist. Thus far, we have ignored equilibrium selection issues and assumed that any of the
equilibria can arise; the regulation deterring equilibria are determined for any possible unreg-
ulated equilibrium. In this subsection, we shortly discuss two equilibrium refinements: payoff
dominance and risk dominance (cf. Harsanyi and Selten, 1988).
When considering the possible equilibria from Proposition 1A (i.e., p < 1
2
), for any two
equilibria with respective disclosure policy σ1 > σ2, the equilibrium with the more informative
disclosure policy σ1 is payoff dominant over disclosure policy σ2, whereas the less informa-
tive σ2 is risk dominant over disclosure policy σ1.14 This implies that under payoff dominance
σU = min(σ ∗(p), σH (p)) arises, whereas under risk dominance σU = 12 arises. For the possible
deterrence of regulation, this implies that under payoff dominance for p < 1
2
, only asymmetric de-
terring equilibria exist: γ (p, σU ) coincides with max(γH (p, σU ), γ ∗(p, σU )). For risk dominance,
both symmetric and asymmetric equilibria exist.
For p ≥ 1
2
, the strategy σU = σ ∗(p) is both payoff dominant and risk dominant for
p < min(pFD, pL(σ ∗)). Again, this implies that in these cases, symmetric deterring equilibria
13 Figure 3 suggests that only the cost of regulation per unit investment k/c matters and not the values of k and
c separately. This need not be completely true. The values pFD(u) depend on u, which in turn may depend on c. For
expositional purposes, we choose to ignore these dependencies. Notice that the relation between pFD(u) and c is not clear,
as pFD(u) is increasing in u and u may depend on c.
14 Details on the proofs on payoff and risk dominance are available from the authors upon request.
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FIGURE 4
EXISTENCE OF REGULATION DETERRING DISCLOSURE EQUILIBRIA AS A FUNCTION OF THE
SUCCESS PROBABILITY p AND PER UNIT REGULATORY COST k/c WHEN u = 12 (I.E., RISK
NEUTRALITY). THE LABELS OF THE DIFFERENT AREAS IN THE GRAPH REFER TO THE
PROPOSITIONS THAT DESCRIBE THE SYMMETRIC AND ASYMMETRIC REGULATION DETERRING
EQUILIBRIA
do not exist, as the symmetric equilibrium that yields the highest investor welfare already results
in the unregulated case. Therefore, regulation can only be deterred by an asymmetric equilibrium.
A difference between payoff and risk dominance occurs in the resulting unregulated equilibrium
when pFD < pL(σ ∗). Then, for pFD < p < pL(σ ∗), full disclosure is risk dominant so that regu-
lation deterrence is not relevant, whereas σU = σ ∗(p) is still payoff dominant so that regulation
may be welfare-enhancing and firms may deter regulation by an asymmetric equilibrium cf.
Proposition 3B.
Summarizing, when considering payoff or risk dominance as the selection criterion for the
unregulated equilibrium, the firms may disclose with very low precision for high-risk investments
(i.e., p < 1
2
) so that both symmetric and asymmetric regulation deterring equilibria exist. For low-
risk investments (i.e., p ≥ 1
2
), the firms already choose a relatively informative disclosure policy
in the absence of (threat of) regulation, so that regulation can only be deterred by an asymmetric
equilibrium.
 The effect of managerial risk aversion. Figure 4 summarizes the regulation deterring
equilibria for risk-neutral managers. Recall that with risk-neutral managers, there are no multiple
equilibria in the unregulated case. A level of disclosure lower than σ ∗(p), namely, nondisclosure,
only results for p < 1
2
. In this case, the symmetric regulation deterring equilibria no longer exist.
The explanation for this is that investor welfare is only determined by the most informative
disclosure policy. Hence, disclosure policies (σˆi , σˆ j ) = (σ, σ ) with σ ≤ σ ∗(p) cannot constitute a
regulation deterring equilibrium, as a firm can deviate to a nondisclosure policy without triggering
regulation; and nondisclosure increases the firm’s expected utility when the managers are risk
neutral, as nondisclosure maximizes the likelihood of generating the good report.
Observe that managerial risk aversion only affects the threshold values γH (p, σU ), pFD ,
and pL(σU ); the threshold values γ¯ (p, σU ), γ ∗(p, σU ), and γ (p) are independent of managerial
risk aversion. In particular, it holds that lim
u→ 1
2
γH (p, u) = γ¯ (p, σU ), which implies that as
managerial risk aversion decreases, the asymmetric regulation deterring equilibria in Proposition 3
A substitute for the symmetric regulation deterring equilibria. Note that this does not affect
investor welfare, as the most informative disclosure, policy does not change; it still equals
σ (k/c). However, the asymmetric regulation deterring equilibrium does create a coordination
problem among the two firms.
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 Disclosure costs. The model assumes that more precise disclosure comes at no additional
cost. When we assume that the cost of disclosure policy σi is increasing in the precision σi , our
results do not qualitatively change. The reason for this is that only deviations to a slightly more
informative disclosure policy matter. This will not materially affect the cost of disclosure, but it
does result in material benefits, as the firm no longer needs to share the investors’ capital when it
discloses a good report. The trade-offs are therefore not significantly affected by disclosure costs.
The conditions on p in Proposition 1 will change to take account of the difference in disclosure
costs, that is, the expressions for pL(σ, u), pH (σ, u), and pFD(u) will change. The resulting
unregulated equilibrium is more likely to be less informative than (σ ∗, σ ∗) when this disclosure
policy is too costly. Summarizing, introducing disclosure costs will not make the equilibrium
disclosures more precise. Hence, the demand for regulation remains.
In the settingwith regulatory threat, disclosure cost does not qualitatively affect Proposition 2
and Proposition 3A. In particular, observe that the equilibrium disclosure precision policy σ (k/c)
is not affected by the disclosure cost. Even if the cost of disclosure policy σ (k/c) is rather high,
deviating to a less precise disclosure policy is not an option as this will trigger regulation, in
which case, the firm has to use a disclosure policy that is more precise and thus more costly than
σ (k/c). A disclosure cost does affect Proposition 3B in the sense that now a disclosure policy
σˆi ∈ [σ (k), 1) may be optimal. This arises when full disclosure is too costly.
 Competition for capital and self-regulated disclosures. Competition between the firms
crucially affects disclosure behavior to deter regulation. First, it is seen immediately that in the
absence of competition and in the absence of regulation or any threat thereof, the firm would
prefer to never disclose precise information, as in that case, all capital will be invested in the firm,
as it is preferred to the alternative investment opportunity without additional information. When
competition between firms is incorporated, this is not necessarily true and firms may prefer full
disclosure (when p ≥ pFD). This is in linewith recent empirical research in Burks, Cuny, Gerakos,
and Granja (2018) showing that competition may create incentives to increase disclosure.
When there is a threat of regulation in a single-firm setting, the optimal behavior is also
intuitively clear. If p < 1
2
, the firm maximizes the probability of a good report by minimizing
its disclosure precision. Therefore, the firm will choose the lowest disclosure level so that the
regulator is indifferent between introducing and not introducing regulation. When p ≥ 1
2
, the
firm will choose a precision σ ≤ σ ∗ when this deters regulation so as to attract all the investor’s
capital, and the firm will choose full disclosure when σ = σ ∗ is not sufficient to deter regulation.
Then, full disclosure maximizes the probability of a good report. Therefore, it is unlikely that
deterring regulation fails in a single-firm setting. However, in the two-firm setting, this no longer
needs to be the case, as a free-riding problem may arise. An improved disclosure by only one
firm increases investor welfare and may make the regulator indifferent. In high-risk markets
(low p), the nondisclosing firm is better off than the disclosing firm, which gives rise to serious
coordination issues.
 Self-regulation and policy implications. Regulation deterring disclosure strategies can
also be interpreted as self-regulation by the sector. The above analysis yields implications for
policy makers, regulators, and supervisory bodies as well as for market participants with respect
to self-regulation.
First of all, for p ≥ 1
2
, our results show that threatening with regulation may result in higher
investor welfare than actually imposing and enforcing disclosure regulation. The mere threat
of new disclosure regulation may be sufficient to achieve the desired disclosure levels without
bearing any cost of disclosure regulation.
Second, when market participants try to set up self-regulation, they generally try to come
up with a set of minimum disclosure requirements to which all participants should comply.
Regulators or supervisory bodies sometimes try to facilitate the self-regulatory process. In all
these cases, large effort is spent to making sure every firm is and remains “on board.” Our results
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indicate that it may be possible (especially when cost of regulation is low relative to market size or
when managerial risk aversion is low) to make investors just as well off by making an agreement
with only a few large market participants.15 Sometimes it may be unfeasible to make every firm
comply. In that case, failure of self-regulation may be due to a coordination problem: which firms
will be “on board” and which will not. Especially for investments with relatively low success
probabilities, the self-regulated firms will be worse off, making the coordination issue a possible
reason why self-regulation will not succeed.
Finally, policy makers frequently first try to make market participants regulate themselves.
Our results indicate when it may be interesting to put effort in this process or when it is likely not
to succeed so that regulation may be imposed more quickly.
 Implications for empirically observed disclosure behavior. The results of this study
indicate that for understanding voluntary disclosure, we need to take into account not only
implemented regulation but also any existing threat of regulation. Consider, for example, the
ambiguous evidence on the effectiveness and efficiency of the Securities Acts of 1933 and 1934
and the discussion about whether government intervention was right. One of the arguments made
against the 1933–1934 acts is that the existence of voluntary disclosure prior to 1933–1934 would
be evidence that existing mechanisms were sufficient to ensure production of a sufficient level
of disclosure to investors. Merino and Neimark (1982) argue that this voluntary disclosure was
not that “voluntary,” but “it does appear to have played a role in deterring enactment of a federal
incorporation law”. They posit that “one motive for ‘voluntary’ disclosure was to preclude more
draconian government regulation.” Our model shows that “voluntary” disclosure can do exactly
this. Our model even suggests that it may well be that regulation is deterred by disclosure up to a
level that investors are overall just as good off as with regulation. With respect to the 1933–1934
acts, it may thus be argued that political pressure had shifted the balance so that regulation was
preferred to self-regulation, although the regulator could have been indifferent when considering
investor welfare. Indeed, scandals often lead to regulation due to public debate (see, e.g., Ball,
2009). If indeed deterrence of regulation was driving voluntary disclosures prior to 1933–1934,
and the regulator was indifferent from an investor welfare perspective, this could explain that
much empirical research does not find a significant change in mean rate of return in the before
and after period of these acts.16 When accounting for costs of regulation that are likely to be paid
eventually by the investors, investors would indeed be indifferent. Apart from political pressure,
another reason to have those acts in place that is in line with no change in investor welfare is
suggested by Merino and Neimark (1982): “The securities acts were not so much acts . . . , whose
primary purposewas to inform investors, but attempts tomaintain a status quo that has perpetuated
the social accountability of large corporations.” Similarly, the ongoing debate on internal control
regulation may have led to “voluntary” self-regulation prior to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX),
which could help in explaining the contradictory evidence on whether investors are better off
after SOX (see, e.g., Engel, Hayes, and Wang, 2007; Leuz, 2007; Zhang, 2007; Li, Pincus, and
Rego, 2008).
Our results imply that observed voluntary disclosure may be due to the threat of regulation.
So, instead of looking for direct economic benefits as explanations for observed disclosure beh-
avior, one may find the explanation in the political environment, that is, the observed disclosure
behavior does not yield direct economic benefits but only serves to deter more stringent disclo-
sure regulation. Instead of finding benefits like signalling, cross-sectional differences in disclosure
15 For example, for the case of self-regulated disclosure requirements for real estate investment funds in the
Netherlands, the regulator tried to facilitate the self-regulatory process by requiring a minimum participation rate of 75%.
This self-regulatory process lasted for five years without any satisfying end result. Some funds appeared to be more
willing than others, but no overall agreement could be reached.
16 For example, Stigler (1964), Benston (1969, 1973), and Deakin (1976) find no evidence of significant changes
in securities prices and investor behavior before and after the acts. On the other hand, some evidence of changed investor
behavior is found by Ingram and Chewning (1983) when separating positive and negative return securities.
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behavior may just be a sustainable asymmetric regulation deterring equilibrium. Such equilibria
are more likely to result in cases where the market size is relatively high compared to regulation
cost. In contrast, regulation deterring equilibria where firms use similar partial disclosure policies
are more likely to result when the market size is relatively low compared to the cost of regulation.
Finally, the results may provide an additional explanation for cross-country differences in
voluntary disclosure behavior. When the possible cost of regulation is relatively high (e.g., less-
developed countries with relatively inefficient or weak legal systems), disclosures have to be
less informative to deter regulation. This could be an additional reason for different levels of
disclosure by multinationals in different countries.
7. Conclusion
 In this article, we derive sustainable voluntary disclosure strategies that result due to a
threat of regulation. We consider a model where two firms offer an investment opportunity and an
investor is investing a certain amount of money in either of both firms or an alternative investment
opportunity. Because of investor response uncertainty, relatively uninformative disclosures may
result as optimal Nash equilibrium strategies in an unregulated setting. We show that a credible
threat to regulate disclosure may increase voluntary disclosure by one or both firms. Surprisingly,
regulatory threat can result in higher investor welfare than actually enacting regulation.
The results yield insight in why self-regulation is forthcoming in some markets but not in
others, and when regulation is more likely to be implemented. With respect to self-regulation,
regulators often try to mediate in finding a satisfying minimum level of disclosure. However,
investors may sometimes be just as well off with a solution where only a (significant) group of
firms discloses sufficient information and the others do not. This may change the focus in the
process of facilitating and mediating self-regulation. It does, however, also create a coordination
problem, as firms participating in the self-regulatory disclosure scheme may be worse off than the
nonparticipating firms. Lack of coordination then results in failure of the self-regulatory process.
Apart from regulation to be implemented because of lack of coordination, it is also possible that
firms need to be too forthcoming to avert regulation. Both reasons for regulation are more likely
to happen in high-risk markets or periods.
Apart from these policy implications, our results provide an alternative explanation for
observed “voluntary” disclosure that is of interest to empirical disclosure research. Our results
show that one needs to take into account potential regulations that are unobserved when trying
to explain voluntary disclosure behavior, as voluntary disclosure policies may not always be
due to direct economic benefits but may also be forthcoming to deter additional regulation.
Furthermore, increased regulation deterring disclosures prior to the introduction of new acts
may provide an explanation for the weak empirical evidence regarding social benefits of new
disclosure regulations, once these have been enacted.
Finally, from a broader perspective, our results related to possible failures of self-regulation
due to coordination problems may be relevant for other regulatory settings than disclosure. It may
be interesting to study for other kinds of market failures whether regulation can be forestalled by
asymmetric preemptive actions and under what conditions such equilibria are sustainable.
Appendix A
This appendix presents the mathematical proofs of the propositions presented in the main text.
Proof of Proposition 1A. Take p ∈ [r0/rH , 12 ) and let σˆi = σˆ j = σ .
Case 1. σ ≤ σ ∗(p).
The expected utility of manager i equals (cf. case I in Table 2)
1
U (c)
· E (U (x˜i (σˆi , σˆ j ))) = 1 − π + π 2 − u(1 − 2π + 2π 2),
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where π is shorthand notation for π (σ ) = pσ + (1 − p)(1 − σ ). In equilibrium, manager i should not benefit from
choosing a disclosure policy σi = σ . We therefore consider when deviating to a lower or higher disclosure level is not
optimal. 
We start with considering deviations to a lower disclosure level. When σi < σ , the expected utility of manager i
equals (cf. case III in Table 2)
1
U (c)
· E (U (x˜i (σi , σˆ j ))) = 1 − π.
Firm i in this case only receives capital in case firm j discloses a bad report. In equilibrium, it should hold that
(1 − π + π 2) − u(1 − 2π + 2π 2) ≥ 1 − π . Rearranging terms yields π 2(1 − 2u) + 2πu − u ≥ 0, which is equivalent
to
π ≤ − u
1−2u − 11−2u
√
u(1 − u) or π ≥ − u
1−2u + 11−2u
√
u(1 − u).
Because − u
1−2u − 11−2u
√
u(1 − u) ≤ 0, only the latter inequality is relevant. Substituting π = 1 − σ + p(2σ − 1) and
rearranging terms yields p ≥ pH (σ ), or equivalently, σ ≤ σH (p).
Next, consider deviations to a higher disclosure level. When σi > σ , the expected utility of manager i equals (cf.
case III in Table 2)
1
U (c)
· E (U (x˜i (σi , σˆ j ))) = π (σi ).
Because p < 1
2
, it holds that for σi >
1
2
, π (σi ) <
1
2
< 1 − π (σi ), so that deviations to a lower disclosure level always
dominate deviations to a higher level.
To conclude case 1, σˆi = σˆ j = σ satisfies the equilibrium conditions if and only if σ ≤ min(σ ∗(p), σH (p)).
Case 2. σ > σ ∗(p).
The expected utility of manager i equals (cf. case II in Table 2)
1
U (c)
· E (U (x˜i (σˆi , σˆ j ))) = π (1 − πu).
We show that manager i is better off deviating to a less informative disclosure level σi < σ ∗(p). In that case, the expected
utility of manager i equals (cf. case III in Table 2)
1
U (c)
· E (U (x˜i (σˆi , σˆ j ))) = 1 − π.
The inequality 1 − π > π (1 − πu) is equivalent to (π − 1
2
)2 > 1−u
u2
. This implies π > 1
u
(1 + √1 − u) or π < 1
u
(1 −√
1 − u). Because 1
u
(1 − √1 − u) ≥ 1
2
> p, the latter inequality is satisfied so that σˆi = σˆ j = σ cannot be an equilibrium
for σ > σ ∗(p).
Proof of Proposition 1B. Take p ≥ 1
2
and let σˆi = σˆ j = σ .
Case 1. σ ≤ σ ∗(p).
The expected utility of manager i equals (cf. case I in Table 2)
1
U (c)
· E (U (x˜i (σˆi , σˆ j ))) = 1 − π + π 2 − u(1 − 2π + 2π 2).
In equilibrium, manager i should not benefit from choosing a disclosure policy σi = σ . 
We start with considering deviations to a lower disclosure level. This analysis is similar to part A and yields the
condition p ≥ pH (σ ). It is straightforward to show that pH (σ ) ≤ 12 . Hence, p ≥ 12 implies that the condition p ≥ σH (p)
is always met.
Next, consider deviations to a higher disclosure level. When σi > σ , the expected utility of manager i equals (cf.
case III in Table 2)
1
U (c)
· E (U (x˜i (σi , σˆ j ))) = π (σi ),
so that the equilibrium condition requires (1 − π + π 2) − u(1 − 2π + 2π 2) ≥ π (σi ) for all σi > σ , that is,
(1 − π + π 2) − u(1 − 2π + 2π 2) ≥ maxσi>σ π (σi ). Because π (σi ) = 1 − p + σi (2p − 1) and p ≥ 12 , it follows that
maxσi>σ π (σi ) = p (i.e., σi = 1). The equilibrium condition then reduces to
(1 − π + π 2) − u(1 − 2π + 2π 2) ≥ p,
which is equivalent to
(1 − 2u) (π − 1
2
)2 ≥ 1
2
(2p − 1) − 1
4
(1 − 2u).
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The right-hand side of this inequality is nonpositive if and only if p ≤ 3
4
− 1
2
u. Hence, deviating to a more informative
disclosure policy does not pay when p ≤ 3
4
− 1
2
u. When p > 3
4
− 1
2
u, it should hold that17:
π ≤ 1
2
− 1
2
√
2 2p−1
1−2u − 1 or π ≥ 12 + 12
√
2 2p−1
1−2u − 1.
Because 1
2
− 1
2
√
2 2p−1
1−2u − 1 ≤ 12 and p > 12 and σi > σ ≥ 12 imply π > 12 , the former inequality cannot be satisfied.
Hence, in equilibrium it must be that π ≥ 1
2
+ 1
2
√
2 2p−1
1−2u − 1. Substituting π = (1 − σ ) + p(2σ − 1) and rewriting the
inequality then yields p ≤ pL (σ ), or equivalently, σ ≥ σL (p).
Observe that 3
4
− 1
2
u ≤ pL (σ ). To see this, the inequality 34 − 12 u ≤ pL (σ ) is equivalent to
1
2
(1 − 2u) ≤ 1
(1−2u)(1−2σ )2
(
1 −√1 − (1 − 2u)2(1 − 2σ )2) .
Substituting z = (1 − 2u)2(1 − 2σ )2, this inequality reduces to 1
2
z ≤ 1 −√(1 − z). Rewriting this inequality yields
1
4
z2 ≥ 0, which holds true for all z.
Summarizing case I, an equilibrium exists if and only if max( 1
2
, σL (p)) ≤ σ ≤ σ ∗(p).
Case 2. σ > σ ∗(p).
The expected utility of manager i equals (cf. case II in Table 2)
1
U (c)
· E (U (x˜i (σˆi , σˆ j ))) = π (1 − πu).
We show that manager i is better off deviating to full disclosure σi = 1. In that case, the expected utility of manager i
equals (cf. case IV in Table 2)
1
U (c)
· E (U (x˜i (σi , σˆ j ))) = π (1) = p,
which is clearly greater than π (1 − πu) as π ≤ p for p ≥ 1
2
.
To complete the proof, we need to show that σL (p) ≤ σ ∗(p) if and only if p ≤ p. Observe that σL ( 34 − 12u) = 12 <
σ ∗( 3
4
− 1
2
u) and σL (p) = 1 > σ ∗(p) for p = 12 + 12(1−2u) (1 −
√
2u). Hence, there exists p > 1
2
such that σL (p) = σ ∗(p).
Furthermore, numerical analysis confirms that this p is unique. Using that pL (σ ) is the inverse of σL (p), the equality
σL (p) ≤ σ ∗(p) is equivalent to p = pL (σ ∗(p)).
Proof of Proposition 1C. When σˆi = σˆ j = 1, it holds that π (σˆi ) = p so that the expected utility of manager i equals (cf.
case II in Table 2)
1
U (c)
· E (U (x˜i (σˆi , σˆ j ))) = p (1 − pu) .
For this to be an equilibrium, manager i should not benefit from choosing a disclosure policy σi < 1.
First, when 1 > σi > σ ∗, the expected utility of manager i equals (cf. case IV in Table 2)
1
U (c)
· E (U (x˜i (σi , σˆ j ))) = π (σi )(1 − p) ≤ p(1 − p).

Because u ∈ [0, 1
2
], this is less than E(U (x˜i (σˆi , σˆ j ))), so that manager i does not benefit from choosing a less
informative disclosure policy σi > σ ∗.
Second, when σi ≤ σ ∗, the expected utility of manager i equals (cf. case III in Table 2)
1
U (c)
· E (u(x˜i (σi , σˆ j ))) = 1 − p.
For (σˆ , σˆ ) to be an equilibrium, it should hold that p(1 − pu) ≥ 1 − p, which is equivalent to
p ≤ 1
u
+ 1
u
√
1 − u or p ≥ 1
u
− 1
u
√
1 − u.
The former inequality is always satisfied as 1
u
+ 1
u
√
1 − u ≥ 2. Hence, manager i does not benefit from choosing a less
informative disclosure policy σi ≤ σ ∗ if and only if p ≥ 1u − 1u
√
1 − u, that is, p ≥ pFD .
Proof of Proposition 1D. Here, we proof the existence of the mixed-strategy equilibrium. Assume managers i and j
choose disclosure level σ ∗(p) with probability q ∈ (0, 1) and full disclosure with probability 1 − q. The probability q
satisfies
q
(
1 − π + π 2 − u (1 − 2π + 2π 2))+ (1 − q)(1 − p) = qp + (1 − q)p(1 − pu),
17 The following root is not defined for p < 3
4
− 1
2
u.
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where π is shorthand notation for π (σ ∗(p)) = 1 − p + σ ∗(p)(2p − 1). The left-hand side of the equation is the expected
payoff when manager i chooses disclosure policy σ ∗(p); the right-hand side is the expected payoff when manager i
chooses full disclosure. In other words, q is such that manager i is indifferent between σ ∗(p) and full disclosure. q ≥ 0
is equivalent to p ≤ pFD ; q ≤ 1 is equivalent to p ≥ pL (σ ∗(p)), which in turn is equivalent to p ≥ p. 
Next, we show that deviating to σi < σ ∗(p) is suboptimal for manager i . The expected utility of σi equals
1
U (c)
· E (u(x˜i (σi , σˆ j ))) = q(1 − π ) + (1 − q)(1 − p).
In equilibrium, it should hold that the expected payoff of σ ∗(p) is at least as good as σi , that is,
q
(
1 − π + π 2 − u (1 − 2π + 2π 2))+ (1 − q)(1 − p) ≥ q(1 − π ) + (1 − q)(1 − p).
This is equivalent to (1 − 2u)π 2 + 2uπ − u ≥ 0. Rearranging terms yields p ≥ pH (σ ∗). Observe that this inequality is
satisfied as p ≥ pL (σ ∗(p)) > 12 > pH (σ ∗(p)).
Finally, we show that deviating to σi ∈ (σ ∗(p), 1) is suboptimal. The expected utility of σi equals
1
U (c)
· E (u(x˜i (σi , σˆ j ))) = qπ (σi ) + (1 − q)π (σi )(1 − p).
In equilibrium, it should hold that the expected payoff of σ ∗(p) is at least as good as full disclosure, that is,
qp + (1 − q)p(1 − pu) ≥ qπ (σi ) + (1 − q)π (σi )(1 − p).
Rearranging terms yields p − π (σ ) + (1 − q)p(π (σ ) − pu) ≥ 0. Because p > pL (σ ∗(p)) > 12 and u ∈ [0, 12 ], it follows
that p > π (σi ) and π (σi ) − pu > π (σi ) − 12 p > 0.
Proof of Proposition 2A. Let σˆi = σˆ j = σ with σ ≤ σ ∗ be a regulation deterring equilibrium. Regulation is deterred
when k/c ≥ ER(1, 1) − ER(σ, σ ). Using that γ (σU ) = ER(1, 1) − ER(σU , σU ), the aforementioned inequality can be
rewritten as k/c ≥ γ (σU ) + ER(σU , σU ) − ER(σ, σ ). Substituting (3) yields that k/c ≥ γ (σU ) + 2p(1 − p)rH (σU − σ ).
Rearranging terms then gives
σ ≥ σ (k/c) = σU + γ (σU )−k/c2p(1−p)rH .

Observe that when manager i deviates to a different disclosure policy, this cannot trigger disclosure regulation. This
follows from ER(σ, σ ) = ER(σi , σ ) for σi < σ and ER(σ, σ ) ≤ ER(σi , σ ) for σi > σ , that is, investor welfare does not
decrease when manager i deviates from disclosure policy σ . Consequently, the same equilibrium conditions apply as in
the unregulated setting: σ ≤ min(σ ∗(p), σH (p)), or equivalently, 12 > p ≥ max(p∗(σ ), pH (σ )).
Because σ ≥ σ (k/c), it must hold that σ (k/c) ≤ σ ∗(p) and σ (k/c) ≤ σH (p). This is equivalent to k/c ≥ γ ∗(p, σU )
and k/c ≥ γH (p, σU ), respectively. Credibility of regulatory threat yields the condition k/c ≤ γ (p, σU ).
Proof of Proposition 2B. The same argument applies as in the proof of Proposition 2A. If a symmetric regulation
deterring equilibrium exists, then it satisfies the equilibrium conditions of the unregulated setting. For p ≥ 1
2
, this implies
σ ∗(p) ≥ σ ≥ σL (p). In addition, σ must deter regulation so that σ > σ (k/c). Because σU is the equilibrium policy in
the unregulated setting, it holds that σU ≥ σL (p). Using that σ (k/c) > σU , it follows that σ (k/c) > σL (p). Summarizing,
in equilibrium, it must hold that σ ∗(p) ≥ σ ≥ σ (k/c). The condition σ (k/c) ≤ σ ∗(p) is equivalent to k/c ≥ γ ∗(p, σU ).
Credibility of regulatory threat yields the condition k/c ≤ γ (p, σU ). 
Proof of Proposition 3A.
Case 1. σˆi = σ (k/c) ≤ σ ∗(p).
Let σˆ j < σˆi = σ (k/c) ≤ σ ∗ be a regulation deterring equilibrium. Deterrence of regulation means that k/c ≥
ER(1, 1) − ER(σˆi , σˆ j ), which is equivalent to σˆi ≥ σ (k/c). From σˆi = σ (k/c), it follows that the regulator does not
impose disclosure regulations. 
We first show when it is not optimal for manager i to choose a different disclosure policy. The expected return for
the equilibrium disclosure level equals
1
U (c)
· E (U (σˆi , σˆ j )) = π (σˆi ).
Choosing a more informative disclosure policy σi > σˆi yields expected return
1
U (c)
· E (U (σi , σˆ j )) = π (σi ),
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which is less than the equilibrium expected return if and only if π (σˆi ) ≥ π (σi ). Using that π (σ ) = 1 − p + σ (2p − 1),
this is equivalent to (σˆi − σi )(2p − 1) ≥ 0. Because p < 12 and σ > σˆi , this condition is satisfied.
Choosing a less informative disclosure policy σi triggers disclosure regulation because σi < σ (k/c). This means
that both managers will use full disclosure policies in the regulated setting so that
1
U (c)
· E (U (σi , σˆ j )) = E (U (1, 1)) = p(1 − pu).
In equilibrium, it must hold that π (σˆi ) ≥ p(1 − pu). Because p ≤ 12 implies π (σˆi ) ≥ p, and because pu ≥ 0, this
inequality holds true, so that deviating to a less informative disclosure policy is suboptimal.
Next, we show when manager j does not want to choose a different disclosure policy. For manager j , the expected
return equals
1
U (c)
· E (U (σˆi , σˆ j )) = (1 − π (σˆi )).
It holds that he is indifferent between any disclosure policy σ j satisfying
1
2
≤ σ j < σˆi . Next, consider σ j = σˆi . Recall
from Proposition 2A that in the symmetric equilibrium (σˆi , σˆi ) deviating to a less informative disclosure policy σˆ j < σˆi
is not optimal for manager j if and only if p ≥ pH (σˆi ). Hence, in the asymmetric equilibrium (σˆi , σˆ j ), it is not optimal
for manager j to choose disclosure policy σ j = σˆi if and only if p ≤ pH (σˆi ). Finally, consider disclosure policy σ j > σˆi .
Then, the expected return equals
1
U (c)
· E (U (σˆi , σˆ j )) = π (σ j ).
In equilibrium, it should thus hold that 1 − π (σˆi ) ≥ π (σ j ) for all σ j > σˆi . This holds true, as p ≤ 12 implies that π (σ ) ≤ 12
for all σ ∈ [ 1
2
, 1]. Summarizing, manager j does not want to choose a different disclosure policy if and only if p ≤ pH (σˆi ),
or equivalently, σˆi ≥ σH (p). Using that σˆi = σ (k/c), σˆi = σ (k/c) ≥ σH (p) if and only if kc ≤ γH (p, σU ). The condition
σ (k/c) ≤ σ ∗(p) is equivalent to k/c ≥ γ ∗(p, σU ).
Case 2. σˆi = σ (k/c) > σ ∗(p).
Deterrence of regulation means that k/c ≥ ER(1, 1) − ER(σˆi , σˆ j ), which is equivalent to σˆi ≥ σ (k/c). From
σˆi = σ (k/c), it follows that the regulator does not impose disclosure regulations. The condition σ (k/c) ≤ 1 implies
k/c ≥ γ (p).
Manager i does not deviate to a different disclosure policy for the same reason as in the proof of case 1. For manager
j , the equilibrium expected utility equals
1
U (c)
· E (U (σˆi , σˆ j )) = (1 − π (σˆi )),
which is greater than 1
2
because p < 1
2
implies π (σˆi ) <
1
2
for all σˆi . Observe that any disclosure policy σ j satisfying
1
2
≤ σ j ≤ σ ∗(p) yields the same expected return. A disclosure policy σ j satisfying σ ∗(p) < σ j < σˆi = σ (k) yields
expected return
1
U (c)
· E (U (σˆi , σ j )) = π (σ j )(1 − π (σˆi )).
This is strictly less than E(U (σˆi , σˆ j )) because π (σ j ) ≤ 1. Disclosure policy σ j = σˆi yields expected return
1
U (c)
· E (U (σˆi , σ j )) = π (σˆi )(1 − π (σˆi )u),
which is less than 1
2
as π (σˆi ) ≤ 12 and (1 − π (σˆi )u) < 1. Hence, mimicking the disclosure policy of manager i does not
pay off. Finally, consider the disclosure policy σ j > σˆi . This yields
1
U (c)
· E (U (σˆi , σ j )) = π (σ j ).
Again, this alternative yields a utility less than 1
2
because π (σ j ) <
1
2
. Summarizing, manager j does not want to choose
a different disclosure policy.
Concluding, an asymmetric regulation deterring equilibrium exists when 1 ≥ σ (k/c) > σ ∗(p). These inequalities
are equivalent to γ (p) ≤ k/c ≤ γ ∗(p, σU ).
Proof of Proposition 3B. The proof is similar to the proof of Proposition 3A Case 2. The only difference is that because
p ≥ 1
2
, manager i prefers full disclosure over the disclosure policy σ (k/c).
Let σˆ j ≤ σ ∗ < σˆi = 1 and σ (k/c) ≤ 1 be a regulation deterring equilibrium. First, considermanager i . The expected
return for manager i equals
1
U (c)
· E (U (σˆi , σˆ j )) = p.
Choosing a less informative disclosure policy σi satisfying σ (k/c) ≤ σi < 1 still deters regulation so that the expected
return equals
1
U (c)
· E (U (σi , σˆ j )) = π (σi ).
C© The RAND Corporation 2019.
26 / THE RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
In equilibrium, it should hold that p ≥ π (σi ). Substituting π (σi ) = 1 − p + σi (2p − 1) yields (2p − 1)(1 − σi ) ≥ 0,
which holds true because p ≥ 1
2
. 
For a disclosure policy σi satisfying
1
2
≤ σi < σ (k/c), disclosure regulation arises yielding expected return of
1
U (c)
· E (U (σi , σˆ j )) = p(1 − pu),
which is clearly less than the equilibrium expected return 1
U (c)
· E(U (σˆi , σˆ j )) = p.
Next, let us turn to manager j . His expected return equals
1
U (c)
· E (U (σˆi , σˆ j )) = (1 − p).
He is indifferent between any disclosure policy σ j satisfying
1
2
≤ σ j ≤ σ ∗(p). His expected return is strictly less for
disclosure policies σ j satisfying σ ∗(p) < σ j < 1. When manager j mimics the full disclosure policy of manager i , his
expected return equals
1
U (c)
· E (U (1, 1)) = p(1 − pu).
This is worse than the equilibrium expected return if and only if p ≤ pFD . Recall that in a full disclosure setting, manager
j does not want to use a less informative disclosure if and only if p ≥ pFD .
Summarizing, manager i does not want to use a less informative disclosure policy; manager j does not want
to use a full disclosure policy if and only if p ≤ pFD . An asymmetric regulation deterring equilibrium exists when
1 ≥ σ (k/c) > σ ∗(p, σU ). These inequalities are equivalent to γ (p) ≤ k/c ≤ γ ∗(p, σU ).
Appendix B
In this paragraph, we explain and present the (pure-strategy) regulation deterring equilibrium when, without the threat of
regulation, the mixed-strategy equilibrium cf. Proposition 1D results. As for the pure-strategy equilibria, let σU denote
the unregulated mixed equilibrium.
Proposition 4. Let σU be the mixed-strategy disclosure precision equilibrium in the unregulated setting, so that pL (σ ∗) ≤
p ≤ pFD . Then, (σˆi , σˆ j ) with σˆ j ≤ σ ∗(p) < σˆi = 1 is an asymmetric regulation deterring disclosure equilibrium if and
only if γ (p) ≤ k/c < γ (p, σU ).
Proof. The proof is similar to the proof of Proposition 3B. First, note that this equilibrium can only result for pL (σ ∗) ≤
p ≤ pFD . The expected return for the investor exceeds the expected return of all symmetric equilibria σˆ with σˆ ≤ σ ∗.
Therefore, if the threat of regulation is credible, the most informative disclosure should exceed σ ∗. This implies that a
symmetric deterring equilibrium is not possible. Only an asymmetric equilibrium can arise and given that p ≥ p ≥ 1
2
,
manager i , prefers full disclosure. This yields the only possible candidate equilibrium (1, σˆ j ).
The equilibrium (1, σˆ j ) is not sustainable if p > pFD , as then firm j would prefer full disclosure (as indicated in
the proof of Proposition 3B). Next, consider σˆ j > σ ∗(p). This equilibrium is also not sustainable, because manager j
only gets capital when i generates the bad report and j generates the good report. When deviating to full disclosure, the
probability of a good report is higher and firm j also gets capital when firm i discloses a good report.
The condition σˆ j < σ ∗(p) is equivalent to k/c ≥ ER(1, 1) − ER(1, σ ∗) = γ (p). The relevant upper bound for this
equilibrium to hold is that of the credible threat of regulation, that is, γ (p, σU ). 
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